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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES IN INDIANA: I
RALPH

F. FucHs*

A. Administrative Law in the Courts.
Common professional learning assigns the problems of administrative law, defined as lawyers view the subject,: to two main areas: (1)
the procedure of administrative agencies themselves; (2) the review
of agency action by the courts. Following a half-century of development,
both areas have become subject to general legislation, adopted by
Congress 2 and a number of state legislatures, 3 which lays down the broad
principles to be observed.4 Whenever such statutes apply, the study of
current problems must begin with them; but these acts are couched in
general terms which acquire specific meaning only as they are interpreted
and applied. Judicial decisions rendered prior to the enactment of the
statutes continue to possess value, therefore, as indications of a jurisdiction's policies, insofar as these are not inconsistent with the new
legislation. 5 More recent decisions, of course, contain the most authorita*Professor of Law, Indiana University. The author is indebted to Indiana University for a grant to assist in arrangements for research into the cases and to Arthur D.
King, Esquire, of the Columbus, Indiana, Bar for preliminary research.
1. The lawyer's conception is usually limited to the law which determines the
proceedings in matters affecting interests outside the government. Other conceptions
embrace, in addition, the law governing such internal matters as fiscal and personnel
administration. See DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (1951). Compare PARxER, ADMINIsTRATiVE LAW 1-2 (1952).
2. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. (1946) (Federal Administrative Procedure
Act).
3. Nathanson, Recent Statutory Dez,elopments in State Administrative Law, 33
IOWA L. REv. 252 (1948), and HEADY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LEGISLATION IN THE
STATES (1952), are excellent commentaries upon the state legislation, setting forth
many of the statutory provisions.

4. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 60-1501 et seq. (Burns 1951) (regulations of state
agencies); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-3001 et seq. (Burns 1951) (administrative adjudication).
5. As to the persistence in other states of pre-statutory judicial holdings with
regard to the scope of judicial review of agency action, sometimes in the face of an
apparent legislative purpose to produce a change, see HEADY, supra note 3, at 113-115;
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tive pronouncements available with reference to those policies. To the
extent, moreover, that administrative procedure statutes exclude agencies
from their provisions, as the Indiana legislation does in part, 6 the
previous case law with reference to these agencies remains in effect.
Except for later statutory changes, decisions which it is the purpose
of this study to review, handed down by the Supreme and Appellate
courts with reference to Indiana administrative agencies, set the limits
within which these agencies must operate and establish the principles
by which the courts of the State will be governed in reviewing agency
actions. The controls thus established embrace the State's administrative
law problems only partially, since many matters have not been covered
in reported cases. An adequate treatment of administrative law requires
first-hand study of the agencies themselves and of their regulations and
pronouncements, both because the details of procedure cannot be covered
fully in any other way and because many of the criteria for critical
judgments emerge only as the agencies' work is observed. 7 Nevertheless,
the reported judicial decisions constitute the framework upon which
other policies and methods must be built. For this reason a review of
them has value.
B.

The Relation of Courts to Agencies.

With the exception of aberrational departures and two recent disturbing decisions," Indiana cases are emphatic in espousing the basic
proposition that the special competence of administrative agencies should
have scope to operate and that the courts in reviewing agency actions
should not attempt to supervise the agencies' work or do it over again.
This view has been enunciated in a series of well-considered holdings,
some of which have become leading cases frequently cited elsewhere.9
Note, De Novo Judicial Review of State Admninistrative Findings, 65 HARv. L REv.
1217, 1219-1224 (1952).
6. Section 2 of the Indiana Act of 1947 governing administrative adjudication,
supra note 4, excludes the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, the Industrial Board, and
the Public Service Commission from its provisions. Benefit determinations under the
Employment Security Act and determinations of eligibility and need under the welfare
laws are also excluded. See note 73 infra.
7. Outstanding studies of the operation of state agencies include BENJAMIN,
ADHINISTRATIvE ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK (6 vols., 1942); DODD, ADMINISTRATION
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936); PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMIISSIONER
An excellent local study in Indiana is STONER, BUILDIN THE UNITED STATES (1927).
ING REGULATIONS IN INDIANA (1951).

8. State v. Marion Circuit Court, 100 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. 1951), 103 N.E.2d 214
(Ind. 1952) ; Public Service Comm'n v. Indianapolis Railways, 225 Ind. 30, 72 N.E.2d
434, 225 Ind. 656, 76 N.E.2d 841 (1947).
9. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940) ; Financial
Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 93, 23 N.E.2d 472 (1939); Albert v. Milk Control
Board, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688 (1936); Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E.
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"The theory of the law creating the Public Service Commission," the
Supreme Court has said, "is that it shall be conscientiously and impartially administered by a body composed of a personnel especially qualified
by knowledge, training and experience pertaining to the subject-matter
committed to it. ..."10 The question for a court to determine in reviewing the work of the Commission is whether its order "is reasonable or
within its power to make"; and in reaching this determination the court
must keep in mind that it is concerned only with "questions calling for
judicial interpretation as, distinguished from matters administrative."' 1
Even when, by legis.-ative direction or as a result of the form of
proceeding in which review is sought, a court undertakes a "trial de novo"
in reviewing administrative action, judicial interpretation tends to narrow the issues to be determined. A frequent type of review proceeding
is the injunction suit brought in a circuit or superior court to prevent
the enforcement of an administrative determination. In such a suit, as
in other actions, a trial is held so that evidence may be received and the
issues determined. If there is an administrative record and it is to
come before the court, it must either be introduced as evidence or be
certified by the agency. It would not be unnatural for the court to
treat such a proceeding like any other action, leading to determination
of the issues on the basis of the court's appraisal of the evidence received,
including, but not limited to, the administrative record, and without
deference to the agency's conclusions. Such was, indeed, the conception adopted by the Supreme Court in one case 1 with reference to
review under the Public Service Commission Act of 1913, which provided for "an action . . .to vacate or set aside" an order of the Com-

mission "or enjoin the enforcement thereof on the ground" that the
terms of the order were "insufficient, unreasonable, or unlawful." The
statute further provided that the case should "be tried and determined
as other civil actions"; but it placed the burden of proof upon the
"party adverse to" the Commission and it provided that, unless the
parties stipulated to the contrary, the court should certify to the Commission any new evidence which it received, differing from that pre438 (1934); In re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65
(1930) ; Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900) ; Keeling v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 117 Ind. App. 314, 69 N.E.2d 613 (1946).
10. It re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., supra note 9, at 674, 171 N.E.
at 68.
11. Ibid. As will appear below, the prevailing formula which defines the role of
the courts in reviewing administrative determinations has become somewhat more
elaborate and precise than the quoted words. These, however, state the essence of
the matter.
12. Public Service Comm'n v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 188 Ind. 197, 121

N.E. 116 (1918).
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viously introduced before the Commission, and that the Commission
should then reconsider the matter. The statute directed the Commission,
in response to service of summons in such a review proceeding, to
certify its record, including a transcript of the testimony, to the court
13
in advance of the trial.
In a later case, New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Singleton,'4 the
court, viewing these provisions in their totality, changed its position.
It quoted with approval a passage from an earlier opinion 15 which
observed that ".

.

. it is to be remembered that the commission is the

chosen agent of the General Assembly for the carrying out of its will,
and that ... the presumption in favor of the validity of an order made
by the commission . . . is strong, and a clear case must be made out to

justify the overthrow of its action"; and it went on to hold that "...
before a court can say that a determination or order is unreasonable
it must appear that there was no substantial evidence to support the
findings of fact upon which the determination or order rested. If there
is substantial evidence to support the findings, and if the order is one
which the Commission has the power to make, in view of the findings,
courts must uphold it.""
The Court in the Singleton opinion differentiated the review in a
case transferred from a justice of the peace court, which supersedes the
previous proceedings altogether, from that in a case involving a Public
Service Commission order where the suit "must be conducted upon the
assumption that the order is valid unless and until the contrary is made
to appear." 17 Under a different statute, however, the Appellate Court
recently wavered from this view in a case involving the dismissal of a
police officer by a municipal board of public safety. The statute there
provided that, after an administrative hearing upon charges, the matter
should, on review, "be heard de novo'" in the circuit or superior court
"upon the issues raised by the charges upon which the decision of the
board was made. . .

."'

A jury might be had upon written request. The

court, however, was to "review the record and decision of such board.'s
The Appellate Court concluded that under the statute an "amotion from
office" involves "a judicial process and not an administrative act," and
that the intention of the legislature was to provide for a complete re13. Ind. Acts 1913, c. 76, §§ 69, 78-86.
14. 207 Ind. 449, 190 N.E. 761 (1934).
15. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Railroad Conm'n, 171 Ind. 189, 205, 86
N.E. 328, 334 (1908).
16. New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Singleton, 207 Ind. 449, 458, 190 N.E. 761,
764 (1934).

17. Id. at 457, 190 N.E. at 764.
18. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6105 (Burns 1950).
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determination in court of the merits of a dismissal, if judicial review
were invoked. '1 Since this conclusion conflicted with earlier holdings of
the Supreme Court under the same statute, 20 the case was transferred to
that court, which found it unnecessary to deal with the problem since
the case could be decided on other grounds. 2 ' The earlier holdings of
the Supreme Court seem sounder, since it should be enough if careful
procedure at the administrative level, accompanied by limited judicial review, is made available. It is arguable, however, that a dismissal from
office on grounds of personal conduct presents issues which a court is
qualified to determine for itself, as contrasted with the more technical
matters involved in a public utility rate case, and that the legislature in22
tended the courts to determine them under this statute.
In light of these authorities it is clearly the established view in
Indiana that the courts are not ordinarily to supplant the conclusions of
administrative agencies with their own determinations in reviewing administrative action. They are to determine only those limited issues,
going to the legality of the administrative action, which are appropriate
for judicial determination without invasion of the administrative province. These issues include questions of the legality of administrative
procedure, of substantive law, and of abuse by the agency, as distinguished
from questions of fact or of expert judgment. The Supreme Court has,
indeed, rejected as unconstitutional some statutory provisions in whicb
the legislature has sought to impose broader duties of review upon the
courts. 2 3 Such duties, in the court's view, would violate the constitutional

provision for separation of the powers of government. 24 "The power,
duties and office of the assessing powers, which is a legislative and
administrative function," the court said in a tax case, 25 "cannot bodily
be transferred to the judicial department ...

where no judicial question

is involved"; and the same is true of all other kinds of administrative
functions. It is therefore surprising that the court, in the face of this
19. Bishop v. Fort Wayne, 91 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. App. 1950).
20. Zellers v. South Bend, 221 Ind. 452, 48 N.E.2d 816 (1943); Lloyd v. Gary,

214 Ind. 700, 17 N.E.2d 836 (1938).

21. Bishop v. Fort Wayne, 228 Ind. 304, 92 N.E.2d 544 (1950).
22. See Note, 26 IND. L.J. 397 (1951). In Hyde v. Board of Comm'rs, 209 Ind.
245, 198 N.E. 333 (1935), holding that the removal of a highway superintendent from
office by the board of county commissioners was judicial and appealable to the circuit
court (Treanor, C. J., and Roll, J., dissenting on this point, id. at 259, 198 N.E. at 338),
the opinion distinguished the removal of a "mere employee, such as a teacher, policeman or fireman."
23. Board of Medical Registration v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92, 96-97, 46 N.E.2d 602,
604 (1943); Peden v. Board of Review, 208 Ind. 215, 195 N.E. 87 (1935); In re
Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667, 171 N.E. 65 (1930).
24. IND. CoxsT. Art. I. § 3.

25. Peden v. Board of Review, 208 Ind. 215, 219, 195 N.E. 87, 88 (1935).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
settled principle, has recently sustained the Circuit Court of Marion
County in substituting its judgment, at least temporarily, for that of the
Public Service Commission in a rate matter, not only, it would seem, to
the extent necessary to guard against confiscation of the utility's property in any realistic sense, but to the extent of prescribing an interim
26
rate schedule.
An exception to the requirement that judicial review of administrative action be restricted to issues of legality has been recognized with
reference to those functions of local authorities which are regarded as
judicial in character. It has been repeatedly held in this State that a
board of county commissioners functions sometimes judicially and sometimes administratively, and the same is occasionally held with respect to
municipal agencies. An action which is "judicial" in this sense may be
subjected to full re-examination on statutory appeal to the circuit or
superior court. The chief difficulty lies in determining what is a judicial
function and what constitute, by contrast, local administrative actions.
Probably the only basis for answering this question lies in historical
and customary considerations, complicated by the fact that local governments perform many functions derived from the English justices of the
peace, who combined judicial and administrative duties. 27 Once the determination has been made in a given case that a particular function is
judicial, it follows logically that the circuit or superior court may subject
the resulting local action to full re-examination on statutory appeal, if the
governing statute so requires. Numerous cases so hold, but no consistent
basis for the decisions has emerged. 28 The Supreme Court has stated that
the basis lies in the procedure employed administratively: If it involves
a hearing and determination on the basis of the evidence adduced, the
proceeding is judicial; if it involves a determination on the basis of
official knowledge or inspection, the proceeding is non-judicial. 29 Plainly,
26. State v. Marion Circuit Court, 100 N.E.2d 888 (Ind. 1951), 103 N.E.2d 214
(Ind. 1952). The case will be discussed further in the succeeding installment of this
study.
27.

See

GOODNOW,

PRINCIPLES

OF

THE

ADmINISTRATIVE

LAW

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES 179-184 (1905).
28. Board of Comm'rs v. Droege, 224 Ind. 446, 68 N.E.2d 650 (1946); State v.
Circuit Court, 214 Ind. 323, 15 N.E.2d 624 (1938) (establishment of township); Hyde
v. Board of Comm'rs, 209 Ind. 245, 198 N.E. 333 (1935); Hastings v. Board of
Comm'rs, 205 Ind. 687, 695, 188 N.E. 207, 209 (1933) (removal from office) ("If the
final conclusion of a proceeding permits the board to exercise a discretion, it will be
judicial. . . .");

Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455, 114 N.E. 965 (1917)

(municipal

board's vacation of street); Board of Comm'rs v. Conner, 155 Ind. 484, 495, 58 N.E.
828, 832 (1900) (road construction) (". . . where in a proceeding the board . . . [hasl
no discretion . . . the decision . . . is judicial. . . ."). Under various statutes the

establishment of improvement districts is made subject to the judicial determination of
the circuit court in the first instance. See McKee v. Hasler, 229 Ind. 437, 98 N.E.2d

657 (1951).
29.

Peden v. Board of Review, 208 Ind. 215, 222, 195 N.E. 87, 89 (1935).
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however, this criterion, if applied generally, would transform all of the
more formal administrative proceedings into judicial ones and in large
part eat away the principle that judicial review of administrative action
must be limited. It is in fact a rationalization of something that cannot
be explained logically.3"
In certain court proceedings which involve matters previously decided by an agency, but which can scarcely be denominated "review"
proceedings at all, a complete re-trial of these matters by the court takes
place. In relation to the recovery of reparation from a public utility, for
example, where a customer or shipper seeks repayment of overcharges, it
it is common for statutes to provide that the shipper may bring an action
in court if the respondent fails to pay a previous administrative award
and that in such a proceeding the administrative order shall be "prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In other respects the suit
proceeds "like other civil suits for damages."'31 Here the matter being
tried is traditionally judicial. It is noteworthy that, by contrast, except
in a few states, 32 workmen's compensation proceedings, although they
replace tort actions, are viewed as non-judicial administrative proceedings, involving the application of statutory schedules of indemnity, and
that only limited judicial review of the administrative determinations can
be had. 33
With respect to judicial review of the usual scope given to the actions
of administrative agencies, the premise that the courts are doing their
own work and not supervising or repeating the work of the agencies
leads to the conclusion that review proceedings, even when denominated
30. The same difficulty of distinguishing judicial from administrative functions
has arisen in some jurisdictions in connection with the question whether certain proceedings are so inherently judicial that they cannot be entrusted to administrative agencies
with power to determine the facts and the question whether a proceeding is judicial
in the sense that it can be reviewed by a court upon certiorari. See Fuchs, Concepts
and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory, 47 YALE L.J. 538, 551-

553 (1938).
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 55-1406 (Burns 1951) (Reparation Act of 1913-applicable
to carriers); American Foundry Co. v. Chicago I. & L. Ry., 100 Ind. App. 111, 178
N.E. 295 (1935).
32. See Bear, Workmen's Compensation and the Lawyer, 51 CoL. L. REV. 965

(1951).
33. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940). See
Grand Trunk-Western Ry. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 IM. 167, 125 N.E. 748 (1919).
It is sometimes suggested that the power to determine facts conclusively, even in a
proceeding regarded as primarily judicial, may constitutionally be vested in an administrative agency. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., supra at 104, 26 N.E.2d at 404. The
Supreme Court of the United States took the same view in Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932), involving a federal compensation act, but held that in such proceedings,
involving "private right," matters of "jurisdictional fact" must remain open to judicial
determination by trial de novo.

/
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;;appeals," are in reality newly-instituted judicial actions 3 4 rather than
continuations of the administrative process. As such, they are subject to
the constitutional principles applicable to judicial proceedings generally,
including the principle that final review by the Supreme Court must remain possible. Legislative attempts to halt review proceedings in the
Appellate 35 or circuit 36 courts have failed. The high court, accordingly,
retains the authority to maintain a body of consistent principles of administrative law, subject to legislative variations within constitutional
limits. It is fortunate that this is so, since conflicting policies otherwise
might find expression in the decisions of different courts without possibility of correction.
C. Proceedings for Judicial Review of Agency Action.
Two principal ways of separating judicial proceedings for review
of agency action into categories have been recognized. Each of them involves a dual classification. The first way distinguishes review proceedings in which the court is confined to the agency record from those which
employ judicial trials to bring agency actions before the courts. The
second classification divides review proceedings into "statutory" and
"non-statutory," using these terms in a highly artificial sense.
Review proceedings in which the court is confined to the administrative record may involve procedural technicalities strikingly different
from those in an ordinary case. In such a proceeding the Appellate Court
recently dismissed an appeal of the Employment Security Division from
a lower-court reversal of an administrative decision, where the appeal
was predicated on the denial of a new trial in the court below. The
appellate tribunal held that since there had been no trial in court, there
could not be a new trial. The statute providing for judicial review clearly
stated that the appeal to the Appellate Court should be directly from the
lower court's initial action, based on an assignment of errors relating
to that action, without the intervention of a motiof for a new trial.
The court might, it would seem, have looked through the charge of
error in the denial of a new trial to the allegation of errors upon which
the motion for a new trial was based, since the allegation appeared in
34. See Board of Medical Registration and Examination v. Moore, 224 Ind. 621,
625, 70 N.E.2d 354, 355 (1947); Elkhart v. Minser, 211 Ind. 20, 25, 5 N.E.2d 501, 502
(1937); Ferner v. State, 151 Ind. 247, 251, 51 N.E. 360, 361 (1898).
35. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940). In
Square Deal Co. v. O'Neal, 225 Ind. 49, 72 N.E.2d 654 (1947), the court concluded
that, contrary to the view taken in the Warren case, the legislature itself had provided
a procedure for transferring workmen's compensation cases from the Appellate to the
Supreme Court.
36. Wilmot v. South Bend, 221 Ind. 538, 541-542, 48 N.E.2d 649, 650-651 (1943).
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the record; but it chose not to do so. It emphasized instead the dichotomy
in methods of judicial review between reviews of records and review
proceedings involving trials, which had been overlooked by the appel37

lant.

The Appellate Court itself appears to have overlooked another aspect
of the theory of judicial review in a recent case, with equally, disastrous
results to the party seeking review. An unemployment compensation
claimant, having had his claim rejected by a referee, appealed to the
agency's Review Board. That body dismissed the appeal because of his
non-appearance at its hearing, notwithstanding a letter from him in
response to the board's notice. In his letter he stated that because of
age, troubles with his health and financial inability, he could not make
the trip to Indianapolis for the hearing. He asked specifically that the
board review the case in his absence. Under the statute, judicial review
proceedings involving such an order lay in the Appellate Court, to which
the claimant accordingly took his case. That court expressed the opinion
that the board abused its discretion by its action but affirmed the board's
order because.the "appellant" had not brought his case to court properly.
He had failed to present "a narrative statement of the evidence heard
by the Referee" so as to demonstrate that he had a tenable claim on
the merits and that, consequently, the procedural error of the Board
was actually harmful. "It is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure," said the Court, "that a party cannot obtain a reversal unless
he affirmatively shows he has been substantially harmed by the error
of which he complains."2 8 (emphasis added) As has been shown, a
proceeding to secure judicial review of an administrative order, even
when the review is to be based on the administrative record, is regarded
as a new action in court.3 9 To reach out for appellate theory in such a
proceeding, with resulting detriment to a class of litigants likely to be
4
40
unskilled in such niceties, seems unfortunate.

1

37. Gardner v. Lohnmann Construction Co., 116 Ind. App. 132, 62 N.E.2d 867

(1945).
38. Poulsen v. Review Board, 106 N.E.2d 245, 247 (Ind. App. 1952).
39. Supra p. 8.
40. See Fuchs, The Task of Procedure When Social Needs Become Legal Rights,

15 Soc. SFRv. REv. 721 (1941).
41. It might be contended that if appellate procedure theory does not apply, some
other theory must; and if the theory surrounding new actions applies, the question is
whether the petition for review is sufficient. Whether on this issue or on that of
negating harmless error, it seems unsound to say that a party, in order to get into
court for the purpose of compelling administrative consideration of a claim, to which
a statute entitles him, must show that he has a basis for his claim on the merits. This
is, after all, one of the very matters to be determined by the administrative tribunal
which, according to the court's own statement, is obligated to review his claim.
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The dichotomy between review of a record and review by means
of a trial, although conceptually fundamental, is not always as distinct
as might be supposed. In a review proceeding which involves a trial,
for example, the administrative record may be the only item of evidence
received. If so, the proceeding resolves itself for all practical purposes
into a review of the administrative record, as frequently happens. 4 2 In
the federal system, the statutory injunction proceeding in a three-judge
district court, which was originally authorized by the Urgent Deficiencies
Act of 1913 for review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and was later extended to certain other agencies, evolved into
a type of action in which evidence additional to the administrative
record was seldom received. Such proceedings, it was widely recognized,
differed only rarely from statutory review of administrative records
43
in the courts of appeals, for which other legislation made provision.
The former method has now been supplanted, except as to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, by the Review Act of 1950, 4 which authorizes
proceedings in the courts of appeals to enjoin, set aside, suspend, or
annul agency orders. In cases where evidence additional to the administrative record is required, the agency may be directed to receive it and,
if need be, to reconsider its conclusions, as may also happen under
45
statutes which provide for the record type of review.
Agency proceedings are affected in significant ways when judicial
review is based solely upon the administrative record; for the proceedings must then be so conducted in all cases as to introduce the basis
for the agency's action into the record with sufficient fullness to withstand possible attack. Official knowledge gained through investigation,
for example, must be translated into evidence of record if it is to be
relied on, even though convenience and speed might be served by leaving
it in the minds of the officials who possess and use it. Iany administrative functions cannot be well carried on through a record hearing,
however, as in, for example, numerous instances of assessment of property for taxes, nuisance abatement, quarantining of diseased persons or
42. Notably in statutory injunction proceedings, such as those for the review of
orders of the Public Service Commission.
43. See, for example, Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 660,
669 (1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 412 (1951) ; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 47
F.Supp. 940 (1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The district court in the former case
perhaps overstated the matter when it asserted that "under well-estabished principles
our function is to hear and determine the questions before us solely on the record made
before the Commission" (emphasis added) ; but it can scarcely be doubted that there
was a growing impression to this effect.
44. 64 STAT. 1120 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1032 et seq. (Supp. V, 1952).
45. It is so provided in § 5(c) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the prototype of federal statutes of this sort. 38 STAT. 719 (1915), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1946).
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animals, issuance or refusal of licenses, or issuance of general regulations involve speedy decision, expert judgment, or extremely complex
considerations. In such situations, the methods of a judicial trial would
be inappropriate. Hence the administrative agency is traditionally free
to proceed without building a record. Action which is taken in this
manner must perforce be reviewed, if at all, on the basis of either
an agreed statement or a trial in court, directed to those issues involved
in the administrative action with which the court is concerned. Numerous
reported cases involve judicial review of this type. 46
The other way of classifying review proceedings, as has been stated,
divides them into "statutory" and "non-statutory" actions. These terms
have reference to the authority for entertaining the various kinds of
proceedings, but the words are not used in any exact sense. As used,
they have reference to whether the proceedings are specifically authorized
by statute in relation to agency action or whether they are available
as general remedies (either by statute, such as a code of procedure, or
under the common law) and may be used, among other things, for
the review of agency action. The same distinction is made with reference to judicial review in the federal system; yet all federal judicial
understood, the classification is
proceedings rest upon statute. Properly
47
frequently.
stated
is
it
useful, and
When statutory review procedures are provided, the use of other
remedies is usually excluded by implication ;48 yet resort to generally
available remedies to prevent usurpation or extreme abuse or to secure
redress because of abuse may still be possible. Where these remedies
are available the theory is often advanced that administrative jurisdiction
to take the past or threatened action is lacking and that, accordingly,
the procedures appropriate to correct errors in otherwise valid agency
action are inapplicable. Perhaps the leading example is in tax cases.
These permit an injunction suit to be brought for the purpose of
preventing the collection of a tax if the alleged administrative error
of substance or procedure is gross enough to render the tax void in
the eyes of the court;49 but the cases remit the taxpayer to his statutory
46. The federal review act, supra note 44, makes provisions for a trial in a district
court in such a case.

47. REP. Arr'y GEN. Comr. AD. PRoc. 80-83 (1941); 42 Am. Jua. 665 (1942).

48. South Bend v. Marckle, 215 Ind. 74, 18 N.E.2d 764 (1939); Milk Control
Board v. Crescent Creamery, 214 Ind. 240, 14 N.E.2d 588 (1938) ; State ex rel. Barnett v.
State Board of Medical Registration, 173 Ind. 706, 1 N.E. 38 (1910) ; Stone v. Fritts,
169 Ind. 361, 82 N.E. 792 (1907). Parallel remedies contemplated by the statutes
may sometimes be available. State ex rel. McCormick v. Superior Court, 229 Ind.
118, 95 N.E.2d 829 (1951); State v. Pigg, 221 Ind. 23, 46 N.E.2d 232 (1943).
49. Department of Treasury v. Ridgely, 211 Ind. 9, 4 N.E.2d 557 (1936). The
plaintiff must also allege actual threatened injury by charging that the assessment is
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remedies if the error is of lesser moment. 50 Discharged city employees
have also been permitted to sue for damages for their wrongful dismissal or to bring actions of mandate to secure reinstatement where
the statutory administrative procedures which should have been followed
in dismissing them were disregarded ;51 and it may be possible to enjoin
further proceedings by an agency, or else its threatened action, where
its members have become disqualified by interest or fraud. 52 Thesej
exceptions do not materially weaken the general rule that statutory!
remedies, where they exist, are exclusive.
There may be priorities among non-statutory remedies too. These
arise because of historical conceptions that some remedies are unusual
and supplementary, whereas others belong in the normal order of things.
Injunction, for example, is still supposed not to be available when
adequate remedies at law exist.53 An analogous doctrine has been fol54
lowed with respect to the "extraordinary" legal remedy of mandate.
Here, however, the emphasis has been on the word "adequate"; and
it has been held, for example, that the availability of penal actions
against an officer for non-performance of duty does not foreclose an
really erroneous in substance. Crowder v. Riggs, 153 Ind. 158, 53 N.E. 1019 (1899) ;
Miller v. Vollmer, 153 Ind. 26, 53 N.E. 949 (1899); Schlosser Bros. v. Huff, 75 Ind.
App. 642, 128 N.E. 452 (1920).

50. Thompson v. Travis, 221 Ind. 117, 46 N.E.2d 598 (1943); Board of Comm'rs
v. Millikan, 207 Ind. 142, 190 N.E. 185 (1934). See McCreery v. Ijams, 115 Ind. App.
631, 59 N.E.2d 133 (1945), commenting that it is "not an overstatement to say that
the decisions are conflicting." New legislation governing the procedure for tax assessment and collection seems desirable for this, as well as other, reasons. Piecemeal
amendments as to particular taxes have been adopted-e.g., the enactment of § 14(d)
of the Gross Income Tax Act, Ind. Acts 1937, c. 117, § 14(d), now, as amended, IND.
ANN. STAT. § 64-2614 (Burns 1951), overcame the effect of Department of Treasury
v. Ridgely, supra note 49.
51. Frankfort v. Easterly, 221 Ind. 268, 46 N.E.2d 817 (1943); Evansville v.
Maddox, 217 Ind. 39, 25 N.E.2d 321 (1940) ; State ex rel. Shanks v. Common Council,
212 Ind. 38, 7 N.E.2d 968 (1937). In the foregoing cases the required procedure was
omitted altogether; but in City of Peru v. State ex rel. McGuire, 210 Ind. 668, 199
N.E. 151 (1937), the opinion of the court leaves it in doubt whether such was the
situation there. The answer alleged, contrary to the complaint, that a hearing had been
given, and the opinion states that "the evidence is such that the trial court was justified
in deciding that the relator was not accorded a hearing as prescribed by the . . . statute."
Compare Wilmont v. South Bend, 221 Ind. 538, 48 N.E.2d 649 (1943), where the
plaintiff was held not entitled to bring a non-statutory action because he had not
availed himself of the right to an administrative hearing. See also Stone v. Fritts,
169 Ind. 361, 82 N.E. 792 (1907).
52. See Burridge v. Mishawaka, 75 N.E.2d 560 (Ind. App. 1947), 225 Ind. 3, 77
N.E.2d 297 (1947), where the final decision rested on other grounds. Compare Pippenger v. Mishawaka, 119 Ind. App. 397, 88 N.E.2d 168 (1949).
53. State ex rel. Alcoholic Beverage Comn'n v. Superior Court, 229 Ind. 483,
486, 99 N.E.2d 247, 248 (1951). See generally Heugel v. Townsley, 213 Ind. 339, 12
N.E.2d 761 (1938).
54. State ex rel. Reichert v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 73 N.E.2d 174 (1947);
State ex rel. Morgan v. Real Estate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 151 Ind. 502, 51 N.E. 1061

(1898).

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 13
action of mandate to compel the duty to be performed. 55 The use of
declaratory judgment proceedings to test the validity of past or threatened administrative determinations has been severely restricted by adherence to the view that the declaratory judgment remedy is not available
if, under the facts, coercive remedies are.5 6 The Appellate Court, however, has rather unaccountably, in the face of this view, regarded declaratory judgment proceedings as available equally with injunction suits to
7
challenge the allegedly invalid imposition of taxes.
The effect of the restricted availability of declaratory judgments
has been to relegate litigants to statutory methods of review where
these have been provided and to the pre-existing "non-statutory" remedies
where they have not. The difficulties connected with this haphazard
collection of actions and the need of supplanting them altogether with
simple statutory review proceedings have been strikingly stated. 58 In
Indiana, however, these difficulties are less severe than elsewhere because
of two factors, one long-standing and the other stemming from the
adjudication act of 1947.59 The first is the non-availability of certiorari
to test the validity of administrative action. 0° The other is the adjudication act's provision for review proceedings, which excludes the "nonstatutory" remedies to a considerable extent. This provision applies to
the adjudicative determinations of state agencies with certain named
exceptions. For most of the latter, including all those actions which
give rise to considerable litigation, previous statutory methods of review
exist.0 1
Certiorari, like the other "extraordinary" remedies deriving from
the common law, is governed by statute in this State. The statute avoids
the traditional term, certiorari, but provides that an appellate court
may require an inferior court to certify a full and complete record in
a pending cause. No mention is made of the issuance of any analogous
order by a trial court or of any means to secure certification of a
55. State ex rel. Cutter v. Kamman, 151 Ind. 407, 51 N.E. 483 (1898).
56. Hinkle v. Howard, 225 Ind. 176, 73 N.E2d 674 (1947) ; Pitzer v. East Chicago,
222

Ind. 93, 51 N.E.2d 479 (1943). See 2 GAVIT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRAcndE

1757 (1942).
57. Department of Treasury v. J. P. Michael Co., 105 Ind. App. 255, 11 N.E.2d
512 (1938).
58. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW c. 17 (1951).
59. See note 4 suPra.
60. Except statutory certiorari to review the determinations of local zoning boards
IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-786 et seq. (Burns 1951). Unlike common law
certiorari, this statutory proceeding may involve the reception of additional evidence
in court to supplement, but not supplant, that in the administrative record. Id. § 53-788.
See O'Connor v. Overall Laundry, Inc., 98 Ind. App. 29, 183 N.E. 134 (1932).
61. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-3014-3019 (Burns 1951).

of appeals.
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record from an administrative tribunal to court. 62 It has been concluded
that the statute is exclusive and that common law certiorari, as such,
has been abolished in this State. 63 No basis has been found for using
the writ to review the decision of an administrative tribunal, and it
64
has not been so used. Hence the difficulties experienced elsewhere,
of distinguishing between the proper uses of certiorari and those of
mandamus, have not arisen in Indiana.
The adjudication act of 194765 specifically states that unless a
review proceeding is commenced pursuant to its terms, "any and all
rights of judicial review and all rights of recourse to the courts shall
terminate." 6 6 Hence, at the least, all other proceedings initiated for
the specific purpose of challenging agency action would seem to be
excluded. There is a possibility, nevertheless, that remedies other than
the statutory one may be recognized in some circumstances where the
alleged infirmity in the administrative order or decision is deemed
to render it "void" and that this concept of voidness may be expanded
to an uncertain extent, as it has been in the tax cases where injunction
has been used successfully. It is to be hoped that, for the sake of
simplicity as well as to avoid harassment to administration, the courts
will interpret the act so as to preserve the exclusiveness of the statutory
remedy, except in rare cases of genuine usurpation of authority. A
factor tending to render this course somewhat difficult may, however,
67
be the short statutory time-limit for bringing review proceedings.
That limit is fifteen days from the order, decision, or determination
being reviewed without addition, even, for possible delay in the receipt
of notice.
A possible liberalizing amendment to provide, for instance, thirty
days from the receipt of notice by the party seeking review would be
desirable in the interest of fairness and of eliminating possible pressure
for the recognition of alternative remedies in cases of hardship.
Whether the exclusiveness of the statutory mode of review extends
beyond barring such non-statutory recourse to the courts as may be
attempted on the initiative of persons seeking review, is not entirely
62.

The statute originated in the Code of 1852.

In its present form it is Ind.

Acts Spec. Sess. 1881, c. 38, § 664, IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3224 (Burns 1946).
63. First Merchants National Bank v. Crowley, 221 Ind. 682, 50 N.E.2d 918
(1943) ; Ex parte Sherwood, 41 Ind. App. 642, 84 N.E. 783 (1908). The opinion in the
former case refrains from actually deciding "whether a writ of certiorari should ever

be used as an independent method of reviewing the judgment or action of an inferior
court in a case where no adequate statutory appeal is available."
64. DAvis, ADMiNISTRATIvE LAW 771-786 (1951).

65. See note 61 supra.
66. IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3014 (Burns 1951).
67. Ibid.
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clear. The act's provision excludes "all rights of judicial review" as
well as "all rights of recourse to the courts"; and it would seem that
it is intended to prevent defenses to enforcement proceedings, 68 based
on alleged invalidity of the orders being enforced, as well as independent actions to challenge such orders. The adjudication act provides
a new means of enforcement, in that an "agency may bring a proceeding
in equity against any person against whom a final order or determination has been made to compel compliance therewith, and the court
. . . in such action shall have jurisdiction to enforce such order or

determination by prohibitory or mandatory injunction."' 9 It would
seem that if the court in such an enforcement proceeding were intended
to have any power to review or refuse to enforce an order or determination, the grounds upon which it might do so would have been
specified, as the scope of review in review proceedings has been; but
there is no such specification. By implication, therefore, judicial scrutiny
of orders in enforcement proceedings seems to be excluded, even though
the exclusion has not been stated in express words. An informed discussion of the adjudication act states only, with respect to the provision
for exclusiveness of the review provision, that it "in effect eliminates
the prior practice of testing agency determination by injunction insofar
as matters within the purview of the Act are concerned."'' 0
The Supreme Court of the United States has had before it an
analogous question under the Emergency Price Control Act. That Act
established statutory proceedings in the Emergency Court of Appeals
for judicial review of price orders. These proceedings were available
for sixty days after an order became effective. The Act provided that
no court should have jurisdiction to consider the-validity of such an
order or to enjoin its effectiveness in whole or in part, except the
Emergency Court in such a proceeding. The Supreme Court held that
the Act precluded consideration of the alleged invalidfty of a price
order by a court in an enforcement proceeding; and it sustained the
constitutionality of the Act so construed.71 Congress, subsequent to the

principal decision to this effect, made provision for the review procedure
68. Review in enforcement proceedings should be discouraged, since such proceedings are often not well-adapted to this purpose, especially in a jury case. The administrative action may lie far back in time and it may be difficult to disentangle the issue
of validity, the evidence with regard to it, and the manner of its determination from
the trial of the alleged violation. See the discussion of Wallace v. Feelumt, p. 23-26, infra,
involving a damage suit against officials which involved similar problems.
69. IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3018 (Burns 1951).
70. RoBERT HoLLOWELL, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDMURE (dittoed ms. 1950). Mr.
Hollowell was one of the drafters of the Act of 1947.
71. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See also Woods v. Hills, 334

U.S. 210 (1948).
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to become available after the normal sixty-day period, upon application
by a defendant in an enforcement proceeding. Further enforcement action
was stayed pending the review. 72 Thus the harshness of the original
provision was mitigated without opening price orders to attack in the
enforcement proceedings themselves. An analogous change in the Indiana
adjudication act is hardly called for, since the act applies to adjudications
involving "particular persons," who will be notified of them, instead of
to general regulations like price orders; but a clarification of the language
and an extension of the period for review such as is suggested above
would be desirable.
Even if review proceedings under the adjudication act and statutory
review under other enactments 73 are held to be exclusive means of testing
the validity of administrative determinations to the maximum extent,
there remain other agency actions that can be reviewed only by "nonstatutory" means. The act of 1947 applies solely to adjudications, and
there is no provision for review of regulations in the corresponding
rule-making act of 1945.74 The adjudication act, morover, does not
apply to local administrative action. 7 5 There also is doubt whether it
applies to state administrative action which is authorized to be taken
in a summary manner. 7 6 Traditional means of review must be employed
72. See the account of this legislation in the opinion in Woods v. Hills, supra
note 71.
73. The adjudication act excepts the Alcoholic Beverage Commission, Industrial
Board, and Public Service Commission, as well as various executive agencies, from
its coverage and also excludes unemployment compensation awards and determinations
of eligibility and need under the welfare laws. The statutes governing the agencies
involved, except the welfare laws, provide to a large extent for statutory judicial
review of the administrative determinations they authorize. See IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 19-192 (Burns 1942); id. § 12-536 (Burns Supp. 1951) (manufacturers' and wholesalers' alcoholic beverage permit issuance and revocation, and cease-and-desist orders of
Commission); id. § 40-1512 (Burns 1952) (workmen's compensation awards of Industrial Board); id. §§ 54-429 et seq. (Burns 1951) (orders of Public Service Commission); id. § 54-1542(k) (Burns 1951) (unemployment compensation awards).
74. See note 4 supra.
75. The act applies to administrative adjudication by "agencies." "Agency" is
defined to mean "any officer, board, commission, department, division, bureau or committee of the State of Indiana," other than those excepted. If local governmental
agencies were intended to be covered, they would undoubtedly have been included
specifically. Mr. Hollowell states that the act applies to "all state agencies" with the
exceptions named-in other words "to some thirty-five agencies." RoBERT HOLLOWELL,
However, school administrations
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (dittoed ms. 1950).
have been held to be state agencies in Indiana. Benton County Council v. State ex rel.
Sparks, 224 Ind. 114, 65 N.E.2d 116 (1946); State ex rel. Osborn v. Eddington, 208
Ind. 160, 195 N.E. 92 (1935); Stone v. State ex rel. Bossong, 208 Ind. 65, 194 N.E.
642 (1935).

76. "Administrative adjudication," to which the act applies, is defined as "the
administrative investigation, hearing and determination of any agency of issues or
cases applicable to particular persons" (emphasis added), with stated exceptions.
The act then provides, "In every administrative adjudication in which the rights, duties,

obligations, privileges or other legal relations of any person are required or authorized
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where no statute applies, whenever review is sought. In Indiana the two
principal means are mandate, or mandamus, and injunction.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance of official duty required
79
8
by law, 77 such as the payment of money, the issuance of a license,
reinstatement to a position, 0 or the commencement of a proceeding. s '
The action sought to be compelled must be non-discretionary-as, indeed
is inherent in the concept of legal duty. The exercise of discretion in
a particular manner cannot be compelled,8 2 nor can action that would
be required under facts which are asserted but which are different from
by statute to be determined," the provisions of the act shall be followed. It goes on
to provide that "the final order or determination of any issue or case applicable to a
particular person [presumably an adjudication] shall not be made except upon hearing
and timely notice." IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-3002, 3003, 3005 (Burns 1951). The logic
of these provisions appears somewhat circular, since they seemingly require a hearing in
proceedings which, by definition, already involve one. The question arises whether this
requirement applies to proceedings which did not previously require hearings, thereby
making these proceedings adjudications within the meaning of the act, or whether the
act applies only where a hearing is otherwise necessary, thus rendering its own
hearing requirement cumulative. The former appears from the context to be
the purpose. A sweeping requirement of hearings in adjudications is thus enacted.
Mr. Hollowell states that the act "gives process and the right to a hearing in many
instances where it did not exist before"; and the scope of the hearing requirement
is indicated by a provision for temporary orders, which can be issued without hearings
in "emergencies." RoBERT HoL.oWE.LL, JR., ADmINisTRATIvE PROCEDURE (dittoed ms.
1950); IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3005 (Burns 1951). Yet there must be a limit to the
act's applicability where summary proceedings are necessary. For example the only
"order or determination" possible where immediate destruction of a dangerous nuisance is contemplated, is the destruction itself. If that were accomplished through
a "temporary" order without a hearing, there would be no occasion for a hearing
thereafter. It seems probable that administrative action of this type was not looked
upon by the drafters as adjudication to which the act applies. The line between
such action and adjudication remains to be drawn. Whatever agency action falls
on the non-adjudication side will, then, be subject to judicial review in "non-statutory"
proceedings, since the judicial review provision of the act, like the other provisions,
will not apply.
77. State cx rel. Rogers v. Davis, 104 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 1952); Gruber, Trustee
v. State ex reL Welliver, 196 Ind. 436, 148 N.E. 481 (1925); State ex rel. Home
v. Beil, 157 Ind. 25, 60 N.E. 672 (1901). See IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2202 (Burns 1946).
78. Rice, Auditor v. State ex rel. Drapier, 95 Ind. 33 (1883); Gill, Auditor v.
State ex rel. Board, 72 Ind. 266 (1880).
79. The availability of other remedies has made it unnecessary to resort to
mandamus for this purpose in Indiana. See State ex reL Barnett v. Board of Medical
Registration, 173 Ind. 706, 91 N.E. 338 (1910). But cf. Public Service Comm'n v.
State cx reL Merchants Heat and Light Co., 184 Ind. 273, 111 N.E. 10 (1916)
(permission to issue bonds).
80. Kostanzer v. State ex rel. Ramsey, 205 Ind. 536, 187 N.E. 337 (1933) ; School
City of Elwood v. State ex rel. Griffin, 203 Ind. 626, 180 N.E. 471 (1932).
81. Hoess v. Whittaker, Auditor, 207 Ind. 338, 192 N.E. 443 (1934) ; State ex rel.
Wyman v. Hall, 191 Ind. 271, 281, 131 N.E. 821, 824 (1921).
82. State ex reL Alexander v. Stevens, 228 Ind. 675, 686, 94 N.E.2d 660, 665
(1950) ; Jackson Township v. State ex rel. Garrison, 204 Ind. 251, 183 N.E. 657 (1932) ;
State ex rel. Julian v. Board of Metropolitan Comm'rs, 170 Ind. 133, 138, 83 N.E. 83,
85 (1907).
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those found by an agency, where it is the agency's function to determine
the facts.8 3 Mandamus can be used, however, if fraud or other abuse
by an agency has led to a fact determination which is deliberately false 4
or if there has been an abuse of discretion through a refusal to reach
the only result legally possible under the actual facts found.8 5 When
the action lies and fact issues are presented, a trial is had which in this
State could be to a jury. 6 If there is an administrative record, it may,
of course, come in as evidence. 8 7
As in other situations involving delicate distinctions, difficult problems connected with mandamus are raised by the necessity of drawing
lines between discretionary and non-discretionary functions, 8 between
fraud or abuse and mere error, 9 and between abuse of discretion and
simple unwisdom. o0 Despite these difficulties, mandamus is a highly
useful, much-used remedy. At common law its usefulness was somewhat diminished by procedural technicalities. The General Assembly
of Indiana doubtless intended to eliminate these technicalities when,
in 1911, it substituted the action of mandate in the circuit and superior
courts for the pre-existing "writ" of mandate, which already had supplanted mandamus. To a large extent the legislature succeeded; but
some of the technicalities remain. Notably, the statute requires that the
proceeding be entitled in the name of the State on the relation of the
plaintiff;91 and if it is not, the cause is dismissed. 92 The utility of
83. State ex rel. Szweda v. Davies, 198 Ind. 30, 36-37, 152 N.E. 174, 176 (1926).
84. State ex rel. Felthoff v. Richards, 203 Ind. 637, 180 N.E. 596 (1932).
85. Public Service Comm'n v. State ex rel. Merchants Heat and Light Co., 184
Ind. 273, 111 N.E. 10 (1916).
86. Steiger v. State ex rel. Fields, 186 Ind. 507, 116 N.E. 913 (1917); State
ex rel. McCalla v. The Burnsville Turnpike Co., 97 Ind. 416 (1884). The court in
the Steiger case did not notice a change in the wording of the statute since the
decision in the McCalla case which conceivably could have been made the basis for
a changed interpretation. Probably no change was intended.
87. See School City of Peru v. Youngblood, 212 Ind. 255, 9 N.E.2d 80 (1937).
88. Public Service Comm'n v. State ex rel. Merchants Heat and Light Co., 184
Ind. 273, 111 N.E. 10 (1916): "A duty is none the less ministerial because the person
who is required to perform it may have to satisfy himself of the existence of a state
of facts under which he is given his right or warrant to perform the required duty."
The real difference between the Commission and the court in the case concerned the
question whether the Commission was entitled to give effect to a policy embodied
in other sections of the governing statute than the one immediately involved, which
was not stated in the particular section. If the Commission had been so entitled,
it would have had discretion to act as it did.
89. School City of Peru v. Youngblood, 212 Ind. 255, 9 N.E.2d 80 (1937).
90. See Steiger v. State ex rel. Fields, 186 Ind. 507, 116 N.E. 913 (1917). If the
proper allegations are made, the action lies; but the difficulty of making the necessary
distinction shifts then to the trier of fact.
91. Ind. Acts 1911, c. 223, § 1, IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2201 (Burns 1946).
92. Danker v. Dowd, 101 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. 1951); Board of Public Safety v.
Walling, 206 Ind. 540, 187 N.E. 385 (1933).
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this bit of insistence on traditional form is difficult to perceive, unless
it lies in a reminder that a judgment in mandamus cannot be had as
of right. 93 Even when the applicable rules of law entitled the plaintiff
to relief, the court may find reasons to deny it because of some overriding public policy. 4
Although it is a residual remedy, not available when others can
be invoked, mandamus is foreclosed only when these remedies are
adequate. 95 Adequacy, of course, is a matter of judgment and of degree.
The resulting uncertainty of remedial law is inescapable so long as
a multiplicity of forms of action prevails. Under any system, moreover,
it would be necessary to determine from time to time whether specific
relief, such as mandamus affords, should be available to persons adversely
affected by administrative determinations. No simplified scheme of
judicial review could avoid this problem in relation, for instance, to
license issuance. 96
Injunction is too familiar a remedy to require discussion here. The
line between it and mandamus is at times a thin one, and the two
remedies are to some extent interchangeable." The distinction between
compelling action, as in mandamus, and forbidding it, as in the ordinary
injunction, is of course fundamental;91s yet an injunction to prevent
unfavorable administrative action may often be a feasible alternative
to compelling favorable action by means of mandamus;99 or the two
93. "In a sense the State is allowing an individual to enforce in the name of the
State a remedy which the individual, as such, is not entitled to have." Board of
Public Safety v. Walling, supra note 92 at 546, 187 N.E at 387. See also State ex rel.
City of Hammond v. Foland, 191 Ind. 342, 349, 132 N.E. 674, 676-677 (1921). In the
Walling case, an appeal by the defendants in an action of mandate failed because the
appellants had omitted the name of the state in designating the appellees.
94. This doctrine seems not to have been actually applied in Indiana. See United
States ex reL. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933).
95. State ex reL. Black v. Burch, 226 Ind. 445, 490, 81 N.E.2d 850 (1948) ; State
cx reL. Slenker v. Burch, 226 Ind. 579, 82 N.E.2d 258 (1948) ; State ex reL. Reichert v.
Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 73 N.E.2d 174 (1947) ; State ex rel. Morgan v. Real Estate
Building and Loan Ass'n, 151 Ind. 502, 51 N.E. 1061 (1898).
96. See p. 28, infra.
97. A proceeding to secure the reinstatement of a wrongfully discharged police.
man is said to be "an action in the nature of a mandatory injunction." Coleman
v. Gary, 220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942); Elkhart v. Minser, 211 Ind. 20, 25, 5
N.E.2d 501; 503 (1937). In Keener School Township v. Eudaly, 93 Ind. App. 627, 175
N.E. 363 (1931), where back salary but not reinstatement was sought, the action was
stated to be one to "set aside" the dismissal.
98. State ex rel. Elliott v. Custer, 11 Ind. 210 (1858).
99. Compare Stone v. Fritts, 169 Ind. 361, 82 N.E. 792 (1907), where, however,
the action was brought prematurely, with other cases involving alleged illegal removal
of public employees, cited notes 50 and 80 supra. See also State ex rel. Alcoholic
Beverage Comm'n v. Superior Court, 229 Ind. 483, 99 N.E.2d 247 (1951) (attempted
injunction against continued suspension of a license).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
remedies may be joined.1 00 Which must yield to the other, under the
rules that each is not available when another adequate remedy may
be had, is a question that appears not to have arisen in this State.
The doctrines surrounding injunction do not emphasize that administrative discretion may not be controlled by means of it, as do the rules
governing mandamus; yet it is evident that a court cannot properly
enjoin action which an agency has discretion to take. 0 1 It is also true
that, even when injunction is otherwise the proper remedy to guard
against a particular instance of threatened illegal action, relief will be
denied if the threatened harm to the plaintiff is not sufficiently immediate
0 2
to warrant judicial intrusion into administration.'
There are three other principal "extraordinary" remedies against
administrative action: habeas corpus, quo warranto 0 3 and prohibition.
The first two have largely potential significance in relation to administrative action in Indiana. The availability of habeas corpus to test the
jurisdiction of police or health officers or the officials of state institutions to detain individuals is clear, however,104 and quo warranto is
one of two common means of contesting the results of elections, as well
as other claims to public office. 10 5 The third additional "extraordinary"
remedy, prohibition, has recently been given greater significance than
heretofore in relation to administrative action, by a decision holding
that it will lie in a circuit or superior court to prevent an administrative
tribunal from continuing to entertain a quasi-judicial proceeding of
which it does not have jurisdiction.' 0 6 The agency there involved was
the Review Board of the Employment Security Division which was
considering whether to award benefits under a provision of the unemployment compensation statute. That provision, the Supreme Court concluded, was unconstitutional because it delegated legislative power to
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Lee v. Browning, 96 Ind. App. 282, 182 N.E. 550 (1932).
Cason v. City of Lebanon, 153 Ind. 567, 55 N.E. 768 (1899).
Greathouse v. Board, 198 Ind. 95, 106-107, 151 N.E. 411, 415 (1926).
Quo warranto is denominated "information" in the governing Indiana statute.
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-2001 et seq. (Burns 1946).
Habeas corpus is provided for in
id. at §§ 3-1901 et seq., and prohibition in id. at §§ 3-2206, 2207.
104. Dowd, Warden v. Sims, 229 Ind. 54, 95 N.E.2d 628, (1950); State ex rel.
Reed v. Howard, Warden, 224 Ind. 515, 69 N.E.2d 172 (1946) ; Darst v. Forney,
Sheriff, 199 Ind. 625, 159 N.E. 689 (1928); Roney v. Rodgers, Sheriff, 190 Ind. 368.
130 N.E. 403 (1921). See IND. ANN. STAT. §22-1223 (Burns 1946). In Goldstein
v. Daly, Warden, 209 Ind. 16, 197 N.E. 890 (1935), an effort to use habeas corpus
to test whether a prisoner was being detained by the warden under one sentence or
under two running concurrently was unsuccessful, where it was conceded that he was
lawfully in custody at the time under at least one of the commitments.
105. See State ex rel. McCormick v. Superior Court, 229 Ind. 118, 95 N.E.2d
829 (1951).
106. State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Review Board, 101 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ind.

1951).
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the board.' 07 The court relied for its procedural decision on an unsupported dictum in a previous case,' 08 treatises and out-of-state authority,
and an inference from two early cases. Each of these cases disallowed
the use of prohibition on the ground that the agency had authority to
proceed, without stating that the remedy was otherwise inappropriate.
In one decision the court said that prohibition, "if proper in the case
at all," could not be sought at that particular stage. 1 9 In the other
case the court noted that normally prohibition lies "to command the
judge and parties of a suit in an inferior Court" to cease the proceeding
because jurisdiction is lacking and that the county commissioners in the
case, against whom prohibition was sought, actually had jurisdiction. 1 0
It has already been noted that for some purposes a board of county
commissioners may be considered a court." : All things considered,
the inference from these two cases that prohibition may be used against
a state agency is extremely weak. The present statute with respect to
prohibition lends no verbal support to the view that the remedy may
be invoked against any other tribunal than a court, for it refers to the
writ's command to "the court and party to whom it shall be directed"
and to the final judgment addressed to "the court and party.""12 The
Supreme Court, in its recent decision, also relied on the statute conferring the same powers on the superior courts to grant interlocutory
relief, including writs of prohibition, as the circuit courts possess; 1:13
but such an enactment throws no light on what the powers of the
circuit courts may be. We are back to the original question. As to that,
there is authority elsewhere for using prohibition to control quasijudicial administrative agencies."14 The court further relied on the
general statute rendering the common law part of the law of Indiana.-"'
It is at best doubtful whether this statute prevails over a specific statute
107. The constitutionality of conferring broad power, which might be considered
"legislative," or power which could be considered "judicial," on administrative agencies
has been the subject of much writing and of many decisions. Its consideration involves
judicial review of statutes and not of administrative action as such. Therefore, it
will not be treated in this article.
108. Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 122, 23 N.E.2d 472, 476 (1939).
109. Corporation of Bluffton v. Silver, 63 Ind. 262, 266 (1878).
110. Board of Comm'rs of Jasper County v. Spitler, 13 Ind. 235, 240 (1859).
111. See p. 6, supra.
112. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 3-2206, 2207 (Burns 1946). The previous statute, R.S.
§764 (1852), 2 Ind. Stat. 298 (Davis 1876), contained the same words as the present
one. Gavit, cited by the court, expresses the view that "presumably the common-law
grounds for a writ of prohibition will prevail and one may in this manner control the
proper exercise of jurisdiction by inferior courts or administrative officers in an
action of this character." 2 GAviT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRAcTIcE 1748 (1942),
113. IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-1418 (Burns 1946).
114. See DAviS, ADMINISTRATivE LAW 688-690 (1951).
115. IND. ANN. STAT. § 1-101 (Burns 1946).
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like that relating to prohibition; certainly it would not as to remedies
which, like mandamus, have been transformed by legislation. Be that
as it may, the decision may have only narrow significance. Injunction
would be an appropriate remedy if prohibition were not, since the threat
of irreparable injury, which the court found to be present in the case,
would support an injunction suit against non-judicial action. It is also
undecided whether the court will permit prohibition to be used in a
case where the alleged want of "jurisdiction" is less fundamental than
the unconstitutionality of the statute upon which the agency authority
must rest. All in all, there is likely to continue to be infrequent resort
to this remedy against administrative action.
The most significant additional "non-statutory" means of judicial
review of administrative action at the instance of a party aggrieved
is the damage suit against the officers who took the action or were
responsible for it. This remedy, of course, operates after the fact and
may often be inadequate for this reason and also because the defendant
may be unable to respond in damages if the action is successful. Nevertheless, it has been used with some frequency,'-" and the possibility of
its utilization may operate in terrorarn upon administration in important
ways.
In Indiana the doctrines as to possible tort liability of officials
are broader than in some other jurisdictions. They include answerability
for malicious action, including malicious abuse of discretion which does
not otherwise constitute a tort, such as withholding a license to one
entitled to it,11 7 as well as liability for trespass, negligence, and other
types of generally recognized tortious conduct. Officials who authorize
or direct the tortious conduct of subordinates by regulations or orders
are equally liable with the subordinates who engage in it;"S but the
subordinates would be solely liable for conduct going beyond their
instructions. In the federal system and in a number of states, by contrast, administrative officials performing discretionary functions share
the immunity of judges from liability, extending even to malicious
acts." 9 Whether the theoretically broader liability in this State has
practical significance is doubtful, since there do not seem to be reported
cases which affirm recoveries by plaintiffs. Successful actions will in
any case be rare because of difficulties of proof and the reluctance of
116. Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 (1934); Branaman v. Hinkle,
137 Ind. 496, 37 N.E. 546 (1893); Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 14 N.E. 68
(1887) ; Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548, 4 N.E. 197 (1885).
117. Elmore v. Overton, supra note 116.
118. Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 (1934) ; Fertich v. Michener,
111 Ind. 472, 14 N.E. 68 (1887).
119. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 801-804 (1951).
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courts to discover abuse on20 the part of officials presumed to be attempting
1
to discharge their duties.

When, in a tort action against them, officials rely upon an administrative regulation to justify their conduct, the plaintiff may seek to
test the validity of the alleged justification. A leading Indiana case,
Wallace v. Feeltan,12 1 which in this respect coincides with an earlier
one,' 2 2 holds that the validity of a regulation may be so tested but
that the question of validity is to be decided by the court, not by the
jury. Such a review of the validity of an administrative measure will
necessarily be of the non-record type, since the attack is collateral and
there is no procedure whereby the administrative record, if any exists,
may be certified to the court-although it may, of course, come in as
evidence. If facts are to be ascertained as a basis for determining the
question of validity, they must come in through a trial or be judicially
noticed. If the former procedure is followed, there will then be in effect
two trials-one to the court regarding the validity of the challenged
regulation or order, the other to the jury (unless a jury is waived)
with regard to the conduct complained of. Awkward procedural problems may well arise in such a situation, as will be the case also if the
validity of a regulation is challenged by the defendant in a prosecution
for its violation.'12 3 If judicial notice can be taken of facts bearing on
the validity of the regulation, on the other hand, the parties can adduce
these facts by references in briefs or memoranda to the court, which
will thus be kept separate from the evidence going to the jury.
120. Branaman v. Hinkle, 137 Ind. 496, 501, 37 N.E. 546, 548 (1893). It is
perhaps significant that in this case the court came in the end to judge the sufficiency
of the complaint, which was in issue, on the basis of the law of libel rather than on
any theory of malicious abuse of discretionary authority. The action was brought
by a discharged school teacher for an alleged conspiracy to remove him from his
position without just cause. See also the court's evident lack of conviction that the
plaintiff could make out a case, in Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 14 N.E. 68 (1887).
121. 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 (1934).

122. Fertich v. Michener, 111 Ind. 472, 14 N.E. 68 (1887).
123. See note 68 supra. Collateral attack on administrative regulations or orders
may arise incidentally to other kinds of litigation also-e.g., a damage suit in which
one party relies on violation of a regulation by the other as negligence and the other
attacks the validity of the regulation. State ex rel. Benham v. Bradt, 170 Ind. 480,
84 N.E. 1084 (1908), was a quo warranto action in which the eligibility of one of
the parties for the office in question became an issue, turning on whether he held
a valid teacher's license or not His license certificate, said the court, "in the absence
of fraud affecting it, is conclusive evidence" of the validity of the administrative
action underlying its issuance. By inference, the question of fraud could be litigated
in such a collateral proceeding. Clearly inquiry into questions of validity in such
proceedings should be held to a minimum even when a jury trial is not involved,
since otherwise extreme difficulties of proof may arise and matters long supposed to

be settled may be reopened. Yet, if a party affected has not had occasion previously
to concern himself with a regulation or order, it may be necessary to afford him an
opportunity to do so when the actual need arises.
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The precedent in Wallace v. Feehan is not clear as to the method
which should be employed for testing a regulation in a damage suit.
The regulations there involved were issued by the Division of Entomology of the Department of Conservation, quarantining certain townships
and prescribing preventive measures to eliminate corn borer infestation
and prevent its spread. Relevant to the validity of the regulations were
certain facts regarding the nature and habits of the pest. The answer
x24
of the defendants in the case contained averments as to these facts,
which were placed in issue by the reply; and there was testimony by
one of the defendants, the State Entomologist, to the same effect as
the allegations in the answer. 12 5 In stating the duty of the trial court
to pass upon the validity of the regulations, the Supreme Court opinion
summarized the pertinent allegations of the answer without identifying
them as such, as a statement of facts which the court below "was bound
to consider." The opinion further asserted that "the court also knew"
that the measures required by the regulations were "an effective method
of checking" the spread of the corn borer-an inference which the
court might have derived either from testimony in the case or from
published sources. 126 The word "knew" might be taken to indicate that
judicial knowledge, or notice, was the proper source of the information;
but the indication is far from certain in light of the procedure below
and the state of the record before the court.
Other cases involving the validity of regulations are inconclusive
as to the procedure to be followed. Wallace v. Feehan was decided in
the Appellate Court before transfer to the Supreme Court but since the
opinion of the former court approves the method followed in the lower
court, of submitting the issue of validity to the jury, it throws no light
on the course to be pursued when this issue is withdrawn from the
jury.1 27 An earlier case in the Appellate Court involved the same regula-

tions; but it was an injunction suit against their enforcement. Reversing
the lower court, the Appellate Court held that, "[I]n view of the facts
shown by the evidence in this case," the regulations were valid.' 28

Blue v.Beach 29 was likewise an injunction suit against the enforcement of a regulation, in which the answer of the defendant officials
contained allegations of fact in support of the regulation, which were
124. Brief of Appellants, pp. 94-95, Wallace v. Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E.

438 (1934).
125. Id. at 386-390.
126. 206 Ind. 522, 535-536, 190 N.E. 438, 444-445.
127. Wallace v. Feehan, 181 N.E. 862 (Ind. App. 1932).
128. Wallace v. Dohner, 89 Ind. App. 416, 165 N.E. 552 (1929).
129. See cases cited noted 9 supra.
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placed in issue; but the appeal was based upon alleged error in rulings upon demurrers, and the evidence was not in the record before
the Supreme Court. 130 Affirming the lower court's decision in favor of
the defendants, the court made use in its opinion of general information
concerning smallpox and the efficacy of vaccination, upon which the
validity of the regulation turned, some of which had been supplied to
it during the pendency of the appeal, 13 1 as well as of facts alleged in
the pleadings, the sufficiency of which was being determined. Presumably
a trial court might do likewise, but the opinion does not say so and it
is unlikely that there was enough difference between the facts noticed
and the facts alleged to raise the issue sharply.
In Blue v. Beach, the opinion analogizes administrative regulations,
when authorized by legislation, to statutes and municipal ordinances,
but recognizes that they, like ordinances, must pass scrutiny as "reasonable" before they are entitled to enforcement.' 3 2 The analogy suggests
that the methods of testing the constitutionality of statutes and the
validity of ordinances may be applicable to similar determinations
respecting regulations. As to the sources of factual information necessary
to pass on the validity of statutes and ordinances, the Indiana Supreme
Court has only recently spoken definitively. "The only extrinsic facts
which will be considered," it has said, "are those of which the court
will take judicial notice." 13 3 Since the case before the court was an
injunction suit, the objection advanced in a previous decision to the
same effect, upon which the court relied,' 34 that otherwise the validity
of legislative action would "depend upon the varying opinion of juries,"
was not directly applicable. By the same token, the authority of the
more recent decision would be persuasive in the situation exemplified
by Wallace v. Feehan, in which a court must pass upon the validity of
an administrative regulation. In this view, judicial notice would be the
approved means of bringing necessary facts into the case. This conclusion is not certain, however; for administrative regulations may be in
a different category from statutes and ordinances. The court has recognized that fact issues may be raised and determined upon evidence by
the trier of fact, where the validity of the application of a statute to
a particular situation, such as is contained in an administrative order
130. Blue v.Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 124-125, 56 N.E. 89, 90-91 (1900).
131. Id. at 126, 56 N.E. at 91.
132. Id. at 130-131, 56 N.E. at 92-93.
133. Department of Insurance v. Schoonover, 225 Ind. 187, 190, 72 N.E.2d 747,
748 (1947).

134. Pittsburgh, C., C.& St. L.Ry. v.Hartford City, 170 Ind. 674, 684, 82 N.E.
787, 85 N.E.362, 363 (1908).
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fixing a rate for a utility, is to be determined. 3 ' The question is whether
an administrative regulation, which is general in its terms but particularizes more than does the governing statute, is to be tested in the
same manner as statutes and ordinances or in the way a court passes
on the validity of an administrative order that applies only to a particular situation. Certainly from the standpoint of procedural simplicity
the former alternative is to be preferred where a jury is to pass on
other issues in the same case. The nature of the judicial task itself,
where the validity of a regulation is to be determined, points to the
same conclusion. The technical or general facts on which the matter
is likely to turn, such as the characteristics of insect pests, the efficacy
of measures to prevent disease, or the needs connected with a line of
business, can ordinarily be determined more satisfactorily by resort to
generally available information than by means of a judicial trial. There
is, however, no consensus among the authorities as to the procedure to
be employed.

1 30

To the extent that statutory methods of reviewing administrative
action are provided and become exclusive, the foregoing difficulties
connected with "non-statutory" remedies are avoided. Many different
statutory methods exist in Indiana, although, as we have seen, important
areas of administrative action are not covered by them. 137 Among them
are the method of reviewing adjudications which is included in the
adjudication act'3 8 and the methods prescribed with respect to a number

of the most important state and local agencies. The latter include the
action to vacate or enjoin the enforcement of orders of the Public
Service Commission;139 the "appeal" to the appellate court from awards
of the Industrial Board ;140 the similar "appeal" from decisions of the
Review Board of the Employment Security Division ;141 lower-court
review proceedings with respect to decisions of the liability referee of
135. Department of Insurance v. Schoonover, 225 Ind. 187, 191, 72 N.E.2d 747,
749 (1947).
136. See Note, 82 L. Ed. 1244, 1260-1261 (1938). As to the need for fact determinations in constitutional cases and the techniques for supplying information to the
courts see, in addition, Bikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting

the Constitutional Validity of Legislation, 38 HALv. L. REV. 6 (1924) ; Note, The
Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49 HARv. L. REV.
631 (1936). The related question of the procedure suitable for the initial administrative
fact determinations underlying regulations and other "legislative" actions of adminis-

trative agencies will be discussed in the succeeding installment of this study.
137.

See p. 16, supra.

138. See p. 13, supra.
139.

IND. ANN.

STAT.

§§ 54-429 et seq. (Burns 1951).

140. Id. § 40-1512.
141. Id. §§ 52-1542(j) et seq.
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the Employment Security Division ;1' 2 lower-court proceedings to enjoin
and set aside safety regulations of the Commissioner of Labor ;143
proceedings in the circuit or superior court of Marion County to challenge
orders of the Insurance Commissioner;144 "appeals" to lower courts
from property tax assessments' 45 and from administrative refusals to
refund overpayments,140 as well as suits or appeals to recover overpayments of other types of taxes;147 and proceedings to review dismissals from various public positions and offices.' 4 The methods prescribed for the judicial handling of these various proceedings range
from strict review of the administrative record, such as the adjudication
act provides, to full trials in court. Equally varied provisions as to the
issues upon review, or scope of judicial review, are stated in the
1

statutes.

49

We have seen that these statutory methods are exclusive of "nonstatutory" review, 15 0 with certain qualifications.' 5 ' In addition, the
statutory methods must be followed strictly in order to avoid a total
loss of remedy. The rationale behind the rule to this effect is sound:
The legislative scheme for judicial review is part of the total scheme
of administration provided in the governing statute. Presumably its
various features were consciously designed to serve the legislative end.
Hence they should be adhered to without deviation, so long as they
52
accord due process, in order to effectuate the statutory purpose.'1
Defendants in such proceedings are equally bound to comply strictly
with the statutory procedural requirements. 53 In this connection as in
relation to administrative procedure itself,' 54 however, it is unsound to
142.

Id. §§ 52-1557(g) et seq.

143. Id. § 40-2143.
144. Id. § 39-5217. This provision is superseded as to adjudications by the adjudi-

cation act.

145. Id. § 64-1020.
146. Id. § 64-2821.
147. Id. §§ 64-2614, 907.

148. See pp. 4-5, supra.
149. The scope of review will be discussed in the succeeding installment of this
study.

150. Wilmont v. South Bend, 221 Ind. 538, 48 N.E.2d '649 (1943) ; Milk Control

Board v. Crescent Creamery, 214 Ind. 240, 14 N.E.2d 588 (1938) ; Culbertson v. Board of
Comm'rs, 208 Ind. 22, 194 N.E. 638 (1935); State ex reL. Barnett v. State Board of
Medical Registration, 173 Ind. 706, 91 N.E. 338 (1910): See note 48, supra.

151. See note 48, supra.
152. Ballman v. Duffecy, 102 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. 1952) ; State ex reL. Brown v. St.
Joseph Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 72, 95 N.E.2d 632 (1950); Culbertson v. Board of
Comm'rs, 208 Ind. 22, 194 N.E. 638 (1935).
153. Michigan City v. Williamson, 217 Ind. 598, 28 N.E.2d 961 (1940).
154. The same point in relation to administrative procedure will be discussed
in the succeeding installment of this study. See the salutary conclusion of the
appellate court in Poulsen v. Review Board, 106 N.E.2d 245 (Ind. App. 1952), that
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insist upon strict adherence to procedural forms, as distinguished from
more essential aspects of procedure such as time limits, where substantial
justice may be defeated by the insistence. Especially is this true in
relation to parties, such as social security claimants, who may be unrepresented by counsel at crucial times. 155
If a statutory scheme for making court review of agency action
available were to be devised to take the place altogether of the "nonstatutory" means, it would have to contain provisions with respect to
the following: (1) suitable means of review (presumably confined to
the administrative record) of agency action required to be based on
the record of a hearing; (2) a somewhat different means of review
(involving a trial in court when fact issues are raised) of agency
action not required to be based on the record of a hearing; 156 (3) the
occasions when, if at all, a suit may be brought to halt agency proceedings before the administrative process has run its course and the
normal method of review has become available ;157 (4) the circumstances
which warrant an action to secure specific judicial relief dictating final
agency action, such as an injunction to prevent action altogether or
a mandatory order to compel action to be taken in a particular manner; s
and (5) the extent to which agency action may be attacked in collateral
proceedings in light of the opportunity, or lack of it, which parties
affected have previously had to challenge the action in review proceedings.' 5 9 No such legislation has as yet been enacted in any jurisdiction, since administrative procedure legislation has contented itself
with either retaining existing forms of review in force' 60 or, like the
Indiana adjudication act, establishing a new form of review proceeding
which does not meet all contingencies.'
the Board should have treated a letter from an unemployment insurance claimant as
an adequate substitute for appearance at a hearing.
155. The kind of decision to be avoided is illustrated in Kravitz v. Director
of Employment Security, 326 Mass. 419, 95 N.E.2d 165 (1950), holding that a petition
for judicial review of the denial of an unemployment benefit claim was properly dismissed because of failure of the claimant to deliver to the Director the number of
copies of the notice of review and petition which the statute specified. Despite timely
notice to the Director, he was, said the court,

"

.

.

. under no duty to act" until the

requisite number of copies was supplied. Such a decision ignores wholly the proper
function of an administrative agency to assist persons coming before it to obtain
their essential rights under the law.

156. See p. 11, supra.
157. See pp. 11-12, supra.

158. See p. 19, supra.
159.

See note 123, supra.

160. As does the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 60
1001 et seq. (1946).
161. See note 76, supra.

STAT.

237, 5 U.S.C.
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An additional question as to the availability of judicial review, not
heretofore discussed in this study, is whether certain administrative
actions should be insulated altogether from review. A recent Indiana
decision establishes one instance of apparently complete insulation. The
Alcoholic Beverage Commission had suspended a retailer's beer and
wine permit under a statute which provided that "[n]o person shall
be deemed to have any property right" in such a permit and that "[n] o
court shall have jurisdiction of any action, either at law or in equity,
to compel the issuance of any such permit, or to revoke, annul, suspend
or enjoin any action, ruling, finding or order of the commission suspending or revoking any such permit. . .

."

The Supreme Court made

permanent a writ of prohibition against the superior court's continuing
to entertain an injunction suit against the suspension. The opinion
points out that the statute was effective not only to foreclose jurisdiction but also to negate the existence of a "civil or property right"
such as is necessary to secure protection by injunction.'" 2 The decision
does not specifically preclude a possible damage suit for the malicious
exercise of the Commission's authority, but it is at best doubtful
whether, even in such a case, the plaintiff could successfully allege
damage to an interest which the action would lie to protect. 163 If not,
the possibility of judicial review in any form and on any ground has
apparently been foreclosed.
Dicta in other cases have been to the effect that

"...

the inherent

right to a review of an order of an administrative board or commission
is not statutory, but a right under the Indiana Constitution." 1 34 This
proposition is correct in cases where the intervention of a court is
guaranteed by constitutional provision, but it is not universally true.
There are various matters as to which judicial review is withheld
162. State ex rel. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Superior Court, 229 Ind. 483,
99 N.E.2d 247 (1951).
163. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held recently that the privilege
of engaging inthe liquor business may be protected against discriminatory denial under
color of state law, by the Fourteenth Amendment and federal civil rights legislation.
Glicker v.Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947); see also the subsequent decision for the defendants on the merits, 75 F.Supp. 283. (E.D. Mich.
1947). Itdoes not appear, however, that so clear a statutory negation of legal right
as that in Indiana was present in the state law involved in the case. The statute,
indeed, accorded judicial review insuspension and revocation cases. See MicHa. Comp.
LAws § 436.20 (1948). Compare Hornstein v.Comm'r, 106 N.E.2d 354 (I1.1952).
164. Ballman v. Duffecy, 102 N.E.2d 646, 650 (Ind. 1952), citing Warren v.
Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940), and Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons v.Board of Comm'rs, 220 Ind. 604, 45 N.E.2d 491 (1943). Both cited cases
involved the right of ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court in judicial proceedings.
Only a dictum inthe Warren case, supra at 104, 26 N.E.2d at 403-404, sustains the
proposition for which the cases are cited.
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altogether.' 65 The problem thus becomes one of distinguishing between
situations where judicial process is guaranteed and other situations
where resort to court may be foreclosed. Indiana authorities are sparse.
Oddly, one case which asserts the power of the courts to intervene
involves a matter conventionally as far removed from legal right as
the privilege of continuing in the position of public school teacher.
The plaintiff had been dismissed by the township trustee and by the
county superintendent of schools on appeal. Alleging bad faith, the
plaintiff brought suit to have the dismissal set aside and for damages,
in the face of a statutory provision that the decisions of county superintendents in such matters "shall be final." Another section of the
statute, however, provided that nothing in the act "shall be construed
so as to change or abridge the jurisdiction of any court in cases arising
under the school laws of this state; and the right of any person to bring
suit in any court, in any case arising under the school laws, shall not
be abridged by the provisions of this act." The Appellate Court held
that the alleged bad faith of the defendants was ".

.

. sufficient to take

the case out of the general rule that the decision of such officer is conclusive and not subject to review."' 160 The language of the statute conferring finality upon the administrative action was, obviously, less strong
than that of the liquor control law.
The Supreme Court has held equitable intervention to be improper
for the purpose of restraining the administrative suspension of a motor
vehicle operator's license. The statute provided a method of judicial
review in suspension cases and included a provision that there should
be no stay of the administrative action during the review. The licensee
having sought review in the circuit court, the judge issued a temporary
restraining order. In making permanent a writ of prohibition against
continuance of the injunction, the Supreme Court stated that the lower
court's action not only violated the statute, but also exceeded equitable
jurisdiction because "[a] license to operate a motor vehicle on the
public highways is a privilege and not a property right."' 1 7 Arguably,
as under the liquor laws, judicial review might constitutionally be
withheld altogether on the same ground; but the ground is a tenuous
one. The line between privileges and rights is shifting and obscure. It
results from conventional factors which often conflict with reality. 6
165. As to federal matters see DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW c. 19 (1951).
166. Keener School Township v. Eudaly, 93 Ind. App. 627, 636, 175 N.E. 363,

366 (1931).
167. State ex rel. Smith v. Circuit Court, 108 N.E.2d 58, 59 (Ind. 1952).
168. The distinction has been more often made and criticized in relation to the
requirements of administrative procedure than with regard to the necessity for judicial
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Just as use of the postal service has come to be recognized as essentially
a right, despite earlier holdings to the contrary,' 6 so the use of the
highways with motor vehicles, upon which the conduct of many of life's
affairs depends, is surely a "civil," if not a "property," right which
can become the subject of equitable protection. 170 It does not follow
that a court should seek to intervene to protect this right in the face
of a contrary statutory provision, where the statute accords a suitable
remedy that also protects the public safety. The impropriety and danger
involved in such intervention makes the court's decision clearly right;
but whether all judicial relief might be withheld is another question.
Branding the affected interest either a "privilege" or a "right" does
not solve problems as to remedy. The answers should turn, rather, on
the practical importance to the persons possessing them of the economic,
personal, or political rights or privileges sought to be protected and the
nature and importance of the public interests which have caused administrative regulation to be placed in effect.
In the federal scheme, executive action in some matters pertaining
to military and foreign affairs or other political problems may not be
questioned in court, but there are fewer matters of a similar sort in
state administration.1

1

7

Where judicial review of state administrative

action is sought, the significant questions as to the availability of relief
are almost uniformly whether, on balance, a particular plaintiff has
an interest that entitles him to invoke judicial review in a given form
and, if so, what the scope of that review may be. Both of these questions
will be treated in a subsequent portion of this study.
To be concluded in the Spring Issue
review. For an excellent criticism of the distinction see GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw, CASES AND COMMENTS 273-283 (2d ed. 1947).
169. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946); Pike v. Walker,
73 App. D.C. 289, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 625.
170. See the able discussion in Johnston, The Administrative Hearing for the
Suspension of a Driver's License, 30 N. C. I- REv. 27 (1951).
171. Dodd, Judicially Nonenforceable Provisions of Constitutions, 80 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 54, 84-92 (1931); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. REv. 296 (1925).
See Clarke v. Board of Collegiate Authority, 98 N.E.2d 273 (Mass. 1951). In Hovey,
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